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Get the Balance Right:  
Private Rights and Public Policy in the Post-Crisis Regime for OTC Derivatives 
 
Jo Braithwaite
*
 and David Murphy
**
 
 
 
Key points 
 The reforms introduced since the 2008 financial crisis have left the OTC derivatives 
market in a state of hybridity, governed by elements of private and public law and 
with a wide-ranging set of stakeholders.  
 This article explores the implications of this hybridity for the ongoing debate about 
the recovery and resolution of central counterparties (CCPs) and for rule-making in 
this area. 
 A conflict of rights analysis is applied to five key policy questions (around framing 
the rules; tear-up; the resolution trigger; the creditor safeguard and the role of equity 
holders) and potential legal challenges are explored. On this basis, we propose a set of 
recommendations for the future regime governing CCP recovery and resolution.  
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The reforms introduced since the 2008 financial crisis have left OTC derivatives in a state of 
hybridity.  What was once a largely private, bilateral market, relatively unconstrained by 
public policy, has been transformed by a variety of regulatory initiatives.  The principal ones 
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for our purposes are the mandatory central clearing of certain standardised OTC derivatives; 
higher capital requirements for bilateral OTC portfolios; and the requirement for many parties 
to post initial margin and exchange variation margin with their counterparties on their OTC 
derivatives exposures.  These reforms have built upon features of the pre-crisis OTC 
derivatives market, preserving some aspects and modifying others.  The result is a legal and 
regulatory framework which is an amalgam of private and public law elements.  The goal of 
this paper is to explore the implications of this hybridity in the context of ongoing debates 
about the recovery and resolution of central counterparties (CCPs).  
The rest of this section contextualises the reforms that we seek to evaluate, tracing the 
development of this framework in more detail, and explaining the accretive nature of the 
post-crisis regulatory regime. 
 
1.1  The pre-crisis OTC derivatives market 
OTC derivatives developed as bilateral contracts between counterparties.  English law was 
often selected as the governing law for these transactions, including those between parties in 
other jurisdictions, because of its long-standing respect for freedom of contract.
1
  This use of 
private law was bolstered by an almost wholly supportive legislative and judicial treatment of 
the derivatives markets.
2
   
                                                             
1
 See, for example, Knowles J’s recent review of the principles of contractual interpretation under English law, 
and his conclusion that ‘the principles described above provide for an approach that seeks to respect the parties’ 
choice, to understand the commercial context, and to provide certainty and consistency in matters of business.’  
GSO v Barclays [2016] EWHC 146 (Comm) at [27].  
2
 The legislative support for netting and other features of financial contracts is assessed in detail in J Braithwaite 
and D Murphy, Got to be certain: the legal framework for CCP default management processes, (2016) Bank of 
England Financial Stability Paper Number 37.  Exceptions to the ‘supportive’ approach of the English 
legislature and courts might include the House of Lords decision in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham B.C. 
 
 3 
This structure allowed the OTC derivatives market to grow enormously from its early 
days in the 1980s until the 2008 crisis.  For instance, statistics compiled by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) show a compound annual growth rate in the notional 
outstanding of OTC derivatives at reporting banks of 25% between H1 1998 and H1 2008.
3
  
The main reasons for this success were: 
 a standardised documentation framework for transactions which nevertheless 
permitted a high degree of customisation of risk transfer arrangements; 
 the use of contractual arrangements which mitigated counterparty credit risk, notably 
collateral posting and close-out netting; 
 standard contractual provisions which permitted a non-defaulting party to close-out an 
OTC derivatives portfolio promptly in the event of non-performance of its 
counterparty, calculate a termination amount, and apply any collateral available 
against it; and 
 a stable legal framework, comprising legislation supporting these contractual 
arrangements and a growing body of case law which provided a substantial measure 
of legal certainty.
4
   
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1992 2 AC 1, finding interest rate derivatives were ultra vires various English local authorities. The disruption 
to the markets caused by this decision was serious enough to prompt the setting up of what became the Financial 
Markets Law Committee to identify legal risks to the financial markets.  
3
 The outstanding notional in the first period reported, H1 1998, was 72,134B USD: in H1 2008, it was 
672,558B.  See BIS, Global OTC derivatives market (H12016) at 
http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/d5.1?p=20161&c=  for more details. (All websites last accessed 22 June 2017). 
4
 See J Benjamin, Financial Law (OUP, 2007) sections II and IV for more details on the effectiveness of the 
legal framework supporting OTC derivatives, and the important ‘safe harbour’ protections from general 
bankruptcy law, which are discussed in detail ibid, sub-section 12.1. 
 4 
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that this framework provided a robust and effective 
basis for facilitating risk transfer between sophisticated market participants.  However, this 
success was not without cost, as discussed next. 
 
1.2  Vulnerabilities revealed by the crisis 
It became clear in 2008 that the pre-crisis norms in the OTC derivatives market had resulted 
in unconstrained and opaque contracting, creating a web of interconnections between 
financial institutions worldwide.  No regulator had a complete picture of the connections in 
these markets, while interested third parties, such as bank investors, had little information on 
the sizes of the exposures to particular parties created by OTC derivatives.  These factors 
proved to be destabilising to the financial system.
5
  
A good example of this phenomenon is the case of AIG Financial Products (‘AIG 
FP’).  The firm sold a large ($526 billion) portfolio of credit default swaps, essentially taking 
credit risk via OTC derivatives.  As the crisis developed in 2008, mark-to-market losses on 
the portfolio helped to weaken both AIG FP and the group of which it was a member, while 
collateral posting obligations exacerbated liquidity stresses when the group started to fail.
6
  
Bankruptcy was clearly possible.  Furthermore, the interconnectedness of the credit 
derivatives and structured credit markets meant that if AIG FP had failed to perform under its 
contracts, it may have endangered some of its many counterparties.   
                                                             
5
 As described in detail in US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 
(PublicAffairs: 2011), Chapter 3 and in Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A regulatory response 
to the global banking crisis (FSA, 2009), Chapter 1.1. 
6
 For details of AIG FP’s portfolio, losses and the bailout see WK Sjostrom Jr, The AIG Bailout (2009) 66 Wash 
and Lee LR 943.  
 5 
An AIG bankruptcy would have been a complex process.  Indeed, the problems with 
using insolvency law to address the failure of a systemically important financial institution 
were graphically demonstrated by the bankruptcy reorganisation of Lehman Brothers a few 
weeks earlier.  They include:
7
  
 the negative impact of wholesale liquidation on entire classes of assets once 
insolvency proceedings begin.  These ‘fire sales’ reduce the value of the bankrupt’s 
assets and cause contagious losses as other parties with the same position are forced to 
mark to market to prices depressed by forced selling by the bankrupt’s administrators;  
 speculation about the outcome of insolvency leading to runs on counterparties 
believed to be exposed either directly or via common asset holdings or both;  
 the length of time involved.  For example, litigation around the administration of the 
UK-based broker/dealer subsidiary of the Lehman Group,  LBIE, continues nearly 
nine years after the group went into administration;  
 the delay before insolvency can take be triggered.  Even if this is only measured in 
hours, markets can move significantly in that period, usually destroying value; and 
 the lack of any requirement to consider financial stability and ‘the continuity of 
banking functions’ in insolvency.8   
 
                                                             
7
 Several of these factors are discussed in J Armour, ‘Making Bank Resolution Credible’ in N Moloney, E 
Ferran and J Payne (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP, 2015) 457.  See also the 
discussion in J Coffee Bail-ins versus Bail-outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate Systemic Risk (2010) 
Centre for Law and Economic Studies: Columbia University School of Law (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1675015). 
8
 See, eg, B Attinger Crisis Management and Bank Resolution: Quo Vadis Europe? (2011) European Central 
Bank Legal working Paper Series Number 13, 8 for a discussion of this point. 
 6 
Given how bad the alternative was, in September 2008 the NY Federal Reserve Bank 
(with the support of the US Treasury) rescued AIG, injecting both capital and liquidity.  The 
need for this rescue demonstrates the financial stability risks which can be created by OTC 
derivatives.  It is, however, one of the few concrete examples: with hindsight, many of the 
broader concerns about the systemic risks of derivatives voiced in late 2008 proved not to be 
justified.
9
  Nevertheless these concerns undoubtedly played a role in undermining confidence 
in many large financial institutions at the time, so there was a powerful case for reform once 
the immediate crisis had been weathered.
10
 
 
1.3  Objectives of the reform programme 
After the crisis, regulators worldwide concluded that the result of individual incentives 
facilitated by freedom of contract and unconstraining regulation in OTC derivatives was a 
fragile, opaque and interconnected financial system.
11
  The regulatory reform programme 
summarised at the start of this paper was launched expressly to reduce the risks OTC 
derivatives posed to the wider financial system; that is, to account for a wider range of rights 
                                                             
9
 An analysis of the causes of losses across the financial system in the 2008 crisis shows less 5% of losses came 
from interest rate and equity derivatives, and less than 1% from FX and commodity derivatives together.  The 
major causes of losses were structured credit positions.  See Table 5.1 in Financial Services Authority, The 
prudential regime for trading activities, (2010) Discussion Paper 10/4. 
10
 The political context of post-crisis regulatory reforms was also shaped by the fact that once states had bailed 
out financial institutions, they had political ‘capital’ to spend on implementing reforms. This is a recurrent 
feature of the immediate aftermath of financial crises, as discussed in J Coffee, The Political Economy of Dodd-
Frank: Why financial reform tends to be frustrated and systemic risk perpetuated (2012) 97 Cornell Law Review 
1019.  
11
 See, for example, G20, London Summit: Leaders’ Statement (2 April 2009) available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf and post-crisis UK and US reports (n 5).  
 7 
than just those of the contracting parties.
12
  In addition to facilitating efficient risk transfer, 
important additional objectives were identified,
13
 principally to ensure that OTC derivatives 
market and infrastructure provide continuity of provision of critical economic services, even 
during periods of financial stress;
14
 to enhance financial stability; and to prevent the cost of 
financial institution distress falling on the taxpayer.
15
  
The reforms were designed to promote these objectives by building on the effective 
features of the pre-crisis market, while seeking to limit its externalities and instabilities.  In 
particular three key aspects of the pre-crisis market were modified in support of these 
                                                             
12
 As reflected, for example, in the G20’s London 2009 Statement, which refers to the fact that leaders 
‘recognise the human dimension to the crisis’ (ibid at [26]) and in the G20’s Pittsburgh 2009 Statement which 
reiterates that ‘Far more needs to be done to protect consumers, depositors, and investors against abusive market 
practices, promote high quality standards, and help ensure the world does not face a crisis of the scope we have 
seen.’ G20 Leaders’ Statement (25-26 September 2009) at [12] available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html  
13
 In the EU context, these objectives find expression both in the preliminary work to the main regulatory 
reforms (see, for example, EU Commission, Ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets (3 July 
2009) EU COMM (2009) 332 final, in particular section 5: ‘The way forward: New initiatives to improve 
financial stability’) as well as in the regulatory reforms themselves: for example, Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and 
trade repositories (‘EMIR’), Recital (4). 
14
 See, for example, Article 21(1) of the EU Commission draft Regulation on a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of central counterparties 2016/0365 (COD) (the ‘draft CCP resolution regulation’), where two of the 
five objectives of a resolution of a CCP expressly relate to the continuity of the failing CCP.  
15
 This objective is strongly reiterated in the Recitals to the draft CCP resolution regulation ibid, eg, Recital (6).  
 8 
objectives.
16
 First, the use of central counterparties (CCPs) was mandated.  CCPs act as a 
‘shock absorber’ to the failure of derivatives market participants and centralise the 
management of any defaults.  They, and their associated risk management practices, reduce 
the risk of direct contagion from a failing OTC derivatives dealer. 
17
 Second, trade reporting 
was mandated to give authorities better information on the interconnectedness created by 
OTC derivatives trading. Third, increased requirements for the financial resources supporting 
bilateral OTC derivatives (both in terms of capital and margin requirements) were imposed. 
These and related reforms have resulted in the creation of a regulatory hybrid 
whereby many of the private law aspects of bilateral contracts are retained, but a layer of 
public policy asserting the interests of a wider group of stakeholders is being imposed too.  
At the time of writing, some of the rule writing and implementation remains underway, 
reflecting the profound complexity of this project.  It is therefore a pivotal period for the OTC 
derivatives market. 
 
1.4  The key role of CCPs 
The different parts of the post-crisis OTC derivatives reform agenda each bring their 
challenges.  Some, such as changes to the capital requirements for bilateral OTC derivatives, 
are relatively self-contained.  But others necessitate additional reforms.  Notably, CCPs 
cannot fulfil their role in the provision of critical economic functions if they are not robust, 
including during periods of financial stress.  This means that the decision to require many 
                                                             
16
 For a further discussion of the reform agenda including aspects we do not discuss (such as trade 
standardisation and exchange or platform trading) see the periodic Financial Stability Board (‘FSB’) progress 
reports on OTC derivatives markets reforms available at http://www.fsb.org   
17
 A comparative analysis of bilateral and cleared OTC derivatives markets can be found in D Murphy, OTC 
Derivatives: Bilateral Trading and Central Clearing (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).  
 9 
transactions to be cleared and to incentivise clearing for others necessarily requires policy 
changes to enhance CCP safety and soundness.
18
  These CCP-related reforms include 
minimum standards for CCP risk management, disclosure and financial resources,
19
 and also 
the development of a framework to support the continuity of critical clearing services during 
episodes of CCP stress, the CCP recovery and resolution agenda.
20
 
This second is important because, absent special provision, a failed CCP would either 
have to be bailed out by public funds or enter into insolvency proceedings as an ordinary 
company.  Clearly a bailout would violate the objective of protecting taxpayers, and we have 
already seen the problems with applying ordinary insolvency proceedings to systemically 
important institutions, a class some CCPs clearly belong to.   
For banks, the public policy response to the shortcomings of insolvency law was a 
combination of ex ante requirements setting out responses to stress, such as recovery plans 
and a flexible and powerful ex post set of tools for authorities through a resolution regime. A 
similar response was evidently needed for CCPs.  As the European Commission 
                                                             
18
 As recognised, for example, in EMIR (n 13) Recital (51), acknowledging that reforms to the authorisation and 
supervision of CCPs ‘are an essential corollary to the obligation to clear OTC derivative contracts.’ 
19
 See Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure (CPMI) and Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Principles for financial market infrastructures (April 2012) 
and the accompanying Disclosure framework and assessment methodology  available at 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi   
20
 See CPMI-IOSCO, Recovery of financial market infrastructures (October 2014) and Resilience and recovery  
of central counterparties (October 2016) available at 
http://www.bis.org/list/cpmi/index.htm?m=3%7C16%7C570  and FSB, Guidance on Central Counterparty 
Resolution and Resolution Planning, Consultative Document, February 2017, (‘the FSB resolution 
consultation’) available at http://www.fsb.org   
 10 
acknowledged, ‘[i]n order to prevent these negative consequences of normal insolvency 
proceedings, it is necessary to create a special resolution framework for CCPs.’21   
 
1.5  Claims on CCPs 
The motivation for CCP recovery and resolution policy may be similar to that for other 
systemically important financial institutions, but transposing rules to a new context is not 
simple.  One issue is that CCPs have a distinct liability structure when compared to banks or 
insurance companies.  In particular, they typically take neither deposits nor issue senior debt.  
Instead, above equity in the creditor hierarchy, there are usually two kinds of claims: first, 
claims resulting from clearing, ie, net amounts owed by the CCP to its clearing members as a 
result of the trades cleared and margin and other resources posted (‘service claims’); and 
second, other claims on the legal entity, including those resulting from the investment of cash 
margin posted to the CCP (‘legal entity claims’). 
As we explain in the discussion which follows, these different types of claims will be 
affected in different ways by recovery tools and by resolution processes.  For example, 
service claims may be subject to modifications permitted in the terms of clearing contracts, 
such as the CCP’s right to terminate (‘tear-up’) contracts in certain circumstances.   
 
1.6  Conflicts of rights 
Another striking feature of the OTC derivatives market which is fundamental to the analysis 
in this paper is the many classes of stakeholder, beyond the CCP’s clearing members.  This 
generates significant potential for conflict over various aspects of the reform programme.  
Particular instances of the general question ‘how much is it worth paying for something that 
may enhance financial stability, and who should pay it?’ recur frequently, for example. 
                                                             
21
 The draft CCP resolution regulation (n 14), Recital (5). 
 11 
Moreover, conflict does not just manifest in the high-level debate about OTC derivatives 
public policy.  When the outcome of a particular policy is that a party is worse off than they 
would be otherwise (for example if ordinary insolvency law applied), they may sue.  Given 
the sums at risk in OTC derivatives market, legal challenges are to be expected after any 
significant event.  Some challenges could even put the reform agenda at risk by creating 
delay or leading to a ruling that invalidates a particular provision in a CCP rule book. Clearly 
no rule-maker wants their policy to be ruled ineffective or illegal by a court.
22
  Therefore it is 
important to understand potential legal challenges before they occur.  This is particularly the 
case as the accretive nature of the policy-making process has created a complex framework 
where different interests sometimes align and sometimes compete. As a result, some of the 
legal avenues available to a challenger are not obvious without analysis. 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes the policy-
making process in OTC derivatives regulation.  It summarises the status of each major part of 
the OTC derivatives reform agenda and introduces the main stakeholders.  Section 3 then 
discusses CCP recovery and resolution in more detail.  As noted above, this is an integral part 
of the post-crisis reform programme.  With this in mind, section 4 presents five contested 
questions in CCP recovery and resolution policy, and section 5 analyses them as conflicts of 
rights, setting out some of the most significant legal challenges available to stakeholders.  
Section 6 then concludes with policy recommendations informed by this analysis.  
 
                                                             
22
 Litigation played a role in the failure of the Paris clearing house in 1974-5, in part because it caused delay and 
disincentivised settlement with members: V Bignon and G Vuillemey, The failure of a clearing house: Empirical 
Evidence (2017), 29-30 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2862673   
 12 
2.  PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS AND DERIVATIVES REFORM 
A stylised model of the policy-making process is helpful in understanding the relationship 
between public policy objectives, rules, and challenges.
23
  In this model: 
 a regulatory or governmental body identifies over-arching objectives, perhaps in 
response to exogenous demands; 
 this leads to a broad policy framework, designed with a view to promoting each 
over-arching objective; 
 detailed policy proposals are drawn up, analysed, and usually negotiated and/or 
consulted upon in dialogue with stakeholders.  Eventually a (typically modified) set 
are adopted; 
 rules are finalised and then implemented according to the applicable institutional 
requirements; and 
 each of these rules has a different impact on stakeholders, who may comply and/or 
challenge the effects.  Challenges often test the application of individual rules, but 
they may also impact on the broader policy framework, for example if a particular 
aspect of policy proves to unworkable, unlawful or sufficiently controversial in the 
market.  
Figure 1 illustrates this model.   
 
                                                             
23
 In reality the process is complex, hegemonic and beset by unexpected adaptations, but an idealised model will 
suffice for our purposes.  See for instance J Black, Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in 
polycentric regulatory regimes, (2008) 2(2) Regulation and Governance 137 for a discussion of these wider 
issues in the construction of regulation.   
 13 
2.1  Applying the public policy model to the OTC derivatives reforms 
As discussed in section 1.3, the original objective of OTC derivatives market – effective risk 
transfer – has been supplemented by further objectives of safeguarding financial stability, 
providing of critical economic functions and avoiding burdening taxpayers.  From these 
objectives flows a new policy framework which seeks to retain the proven features of 
contractual derivatives relationships and supplement it with trade reporting, measures to 
promote clearing, enhanced risk management standards for CCPs and the additional measures 
outlined above in order to protect the rights of other stakeholders.    
 
2.2  The status of the principal OTC derivatives reforms 
Many of the post-crisis reforms to the OTC derivatives market have already gone beyond 
rule-making into implementation.  For instance, the clearing mandate has been implemented 
in most major jurisdictions, and the reforms requiring the posting of initial and variation 
margin against many bilateral OTC derivatives positions have been finalised and are being 
implemented in the US and the EU, amongst other jurisdictions.
24
  Reforms relating to CCP 
governance are also progressing, with some implementation monitoring already taking 
place.
25
 
Policy development relating to CCP recovery and resolution, however, remains on-
going, with proposals being advanced at both international standard-setting and jurisdictional 
                                                             
24
 For a recent summary covering all elements of the new reforms and comparing progress jurisdiction by 
jurisdiction, see FSB, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: Eleventh Progress Report on Implementation (October 
2016) available at www.fsb.org/2016/08/otc-derivatives-market-reforms-eleventh-progress-report-on-
implementation/   
25
 See for instance CPMI IOSCO, Implementation monitoring of PFMI: Level 3 assessment - Report on the 
financial risk management and recovery practices of 10 derivatives CCPs (August 2016) available at 
www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d148.htm   
 14 
levels.  In this paper we concentrate on the former, as draft legislative proposals broadly 
follow international standards and final proposals are not yet available.
26
 
 
Figure 1 — Illustration of a stylised public policy process 
An important source for understanding financial institution resolution is the 2014 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) document known as ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution 
Regimes’.27  Initial work focussed primarily on bank resolution, although the document has 
an annex on Financial Market Infrastructure.  Subsequently the FSB produced a more 
                                                             
26
 See for example, the European Commission’s draft CCP resolution regulation (n 14). 
27
 FSB, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, October 2014, available at 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf . 
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detailed consultative document on CCP resolution, and stated that it ‘will continue its work 
on financial resources for CCP resolution and, … determine by end-2018 whether there is 
need for any additional guidance’.28  At the timing of writing we are therefore at the stage in 
Figure 1 labelled ‘Consultation’. 
 
2.3  Stakeholders 
One of the reasons that the CCP recovery and resolution rules are being written towards the 
end of the overall reform process is that they involve so many stakeholders.  Central clearing 
of OTC derivatives involves the CCP and its clearing members who deal with each other 
directly, according to the terms of their membership agreement, but it also involves parties 
who access central clearing as clients of clearing members.  These clients have a stake in the 
CCP through an intermediated chain rather than through a direct bilateral relationship.  The 
CCP is often a privately owned or publically traded corporation, so its owners are also 
relevant too (in particular in any recovery or resolution scenario).  Other stakeholders 
potentially include the CCP’s national regulators and others with a regulatory nexus, 
including the resolution authority (if this is not the primary regulator); regional regulators; 
and global standard-setters.  A further group of interested parties are those with other 
relationships with the CCP including settlement banks, custodians or inter-operating CCPs.  
Finally, taxpayers have an interest, as not burdening the public purse is a central objective of 
the post-crisis reforms.   
This wide range of stakeholders means that the debate about recovery and resolution 
must not only factor in the rights and liabilities of parties in bilateral relationships (where the 
most straightforward way of enforcing rights will be through contract) but also the numerous, 
and sometimes conflicting, rights and liabilities which otherwise arise. 
                                                             
28
 See the FSB resolution consultation (n 20), 2.  
 16 
3.  POLICY PROPOSALS IN CCP RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 
Consultation on CCP recovery and resolution rules is underway at the time of writing, at FSB 
and EU-levels, as previously discussed.
29
 These proposals draw heavily from the bank 
recovery and resolution regime, and this section looks in more detail at their key features.  
 
3.1  Recovery and resolution 
Recovery is the first phase of stabilising a stressed financial institution.  In the case of a CCP, 
the entity and its members must formulate plans for recovery which are agreed in advance 
and which can be implemented if and when necessary.  These will typically involve 
incentives for members to assist the CCP in matching its book, loss allocation mechanisms, 
and extra contributions from members to the CCP’s funded financial resources.  This process 
is implemented contractually through the CCP’s rule book, and it will be subject to review 
from the CCP’s national supervisor. 
It is only if this recovery phase does not, or seems unlikely to, stabilise the CCP that a 
resolution authority (‘RA’) will step in.  RAs are public authorities which are charged with 
pursuing particular statutory financial stability objectives: they have specific tools and 
powers at their disposal in addition to those available in recovery to achieve these objectives.  
Triggering a resolution can therefore be seen as a pivot between a private and a public 
regime.  However, as we explain below, the legal perspective suggests that public and private 
law are relevant to both stages.  
The UK banking resolution regime has evolved so that the Bank of England, as RA, 
now has three stabilisation options: a transfer of all or part of the firm’s business to a private 
sector purchaser; a transfer to a bridge bank; and a bail-in to absorb the losses of the firm and 
                                                             
29
 See, respectively, the FSB resolution consultation (n 20) and the draft CCP resolution regulation (n 14). 
 17 
recapitalise the failing institution ‘in place’.30  A similar regime has been adapted and 
proposed for CCPs and other non-financial institutions.  
 
3.2 Policy Proposals for CCPs 
The most important elements of the proposed CCP recovery and resolution rules can be 
grouped into five categories: 
 Rules which govern the recovery phase; primarily by imposing requirements for 
CCP’s recovery plans and a framework for their assessment by the relevant authority;  
 Rules which determine whether resolution is required.  In the case of a CCP, 
resolution is contemplated when a clearing house is failing or likely to fail, perhaps 
because it has lost the market’s confidence; when it is reasonably unlikely actions 
other than resolution (for instance the CCP’s own recovery actions or actions directed 
by its supervisory authority) will restore stability; and when its resolution is in the 
public interest and in the interests of financial stability. 
 Rules which assist in returning to a matched book in resolution, including position 
allocation tools; 
 Rules which provide additional tools or resources to RAs.  In the context of a CCP, 
these tools consist of loss allocation tools; tools to increase resources, for instance by 
allowing the CCP to reduce (‘haircut’) variation margin gains paid to parties who are 
                                                             
30
 Under the Banking Act 2009, which implements the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 2014/59/EU. 
For further detail on the UK regime see The Bank of England, The Bank of England’s Approach to Resolution 
(October 2014) available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/resolution/apr231014.pdf   
The evolution of the bank resolution regime in the wake of the crisis from ‘first’ to ‘second generation’ 
measures is charted in Armour (n 7).  
 18 
‘in the money’, or by means of a cash call on members reserved for authorities (the 
‘RA call’); a write-down and conversion tool (the equivalent of ‘bail-in’); a sale of 
business tool; a bridge CCP tool; and a ‘catch all’ tool, allowing RAs other powers 
consistent with the objectives of resolution and, in extraordinary circumstances, 
allowing access to public finance.
31
 
 Rules which provide protection against arbitrary action by the authorities in resolution 
and other safeguards for stakeholders, such as an equivalent of the banking ‘No 
Creditor Worse Off’ (‘NCWO’) safeguard,32 and rules protecting financial collateral 
and netting arrangements.  These safeguards are clear examples where regulators have 
to decide how to balance conflicting interests of different stakeholders.  
 
The fourth category of rules is particularly worthy of note here: if RAs only have the same 
tools and resources available to them as were available to the CCP in recovery, then there 
will be circumstances where they will be unlikely to succeed where the CCP has failed.
33
  
Therefore there is a good case for extra resources, such as the RA call, and extra tools, such 
as write-down and conversion, being available to the RA.    
 
3.3 Default and Non-Default Losses 
There is also a distinction within the proposed CCP recovery and resolution regime between 
rules which apply to default-related losses, and those which apply to other causes of stress. 
                                                             
31
 See, for example, Article 27 of the draft CCP resolution regulation (n 14). 
32
 See, for example, ibid, Article 62. 
33
 Of course, the RA may be successful where the CCP was not if confidence has been lost in the CCP’s 
management or if other features of authority intervention, such as the ability to provide liquidity to the CCP or 
to clearing members or both against good collateral, are material.  But this will not always be the case.  
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The latter are collectively labelled as ‘non-default losses’ but in reality they span very diverse 
potential causes of a CCP’s stress including cyber-attack, fraud and other forms of 
operational risk.
34
  The distinction between default and non-default losses is an important 
factor influencing how recovery and resolution may unfold in practice, and it complicates 
rule-making.  Figure 2 illustrates this rules ‘architecture’. 
 
Cause of stress Recovery Resolution 
Default  Balancing book/managing default Balancing book/managing default 
Absorbing default losses Absorbing default losses 
Refilling default resources Refilling default resources 
Non-default Determining the size of a non-
default loss and preventing further 
losses 
Determining the size of a non-
default loss and preventing further 
losses 
Absorbing the loss Absorbing the loss 
Any Recapitalising the CCP Recapitalising the CCP 
Trigger for resolution 
 Transfer tools 
 Safeguards  
Figure 2 — Illustration of the structure of CCP recovery and resolution rules 
 
                                                             
34
 LCH.Clearnet, Recovery and Resolution: A Framework for CCPs (2016), 6-7 available at 
www.lch.com/documents/731485/762444/-and-resolution-a-framework-for-ccps.pdf/ includes nine different 
scenarios which may trigger risk at a CCP including legal risk, problems with suppliers and failure of a 
settlement bank.  See further discussion of the drafting implications for CCPs’ rule books at section 5.1.1 below.  
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This is one of the features of CCPs which generates challenges for rule-makers as they move 
into the rule-making phase for CCP recovery and resolution. Others arise from CCPs’ public 
function yet often private ownership, and from the highly diverse range of stakeholders. The 
next section considers the ongoing debate around a number of these rule-making challenges.   
 
4.  RULE-MAKING IN CCP RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 
At the point where CCP recovery and resolution rules emerge from consultation to be framed 
as binding rules (as set out in Figure 1 above) there will be some acutely difficult decisions 
facing policy-makers.  Policy controversy usually arises because one or more parties are 
aggrieved at the potential impact of a rule.  CCP recovery and resolution is likely to generate 
sufficiently material grievances that one or more disadvantaged parties are likely to contest 
the outcome. As we discuss in section 1.6 above, this may result in both technical challenges 
and have impact on the broader policy framework.  Therefore, we argue that it is important to 
study areas of policy which might offer the most fertile ground for challenges at this phase of 
the policy-making cycle.  The rest of this section sets out five policy questions which are 
contested and which provide insights into particular types of challenge; the following section 
discusses the legal issues embodied in each of them. 
 
4.1  How should recovery and resolution rules be framed? 
The first policy question concerns how the recovery and resolution toolkit is framed in law.  
In terms of recovery, this issue turns on the extent to which plans should be regulated in 
detail by legislation, or whether discretion about the nature of recovery tools should be left to 
CCPs and set out as they choose in their rule books.  In the case of resolution, the issue is 
whether resolution powers should be provided for in legislation or whether RAs should 
merely step into the shoes of the CCP and use its contractual rights.  In the banking context, 
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the Special Resolution Regime for banks in England and Wales is set out in the Banking Act 
2009, and this gives certain specified powers to the Bank of England as RA: in other words, 
the legislative route was taken.  Should the same be done for CCPs? 
This question is interesting in particular because it has a bearing on the legal 
framework for resolution actions.  If resolution rules are implemented in the CCP rule book, 
then the RA primarily conducts a resolution using the contractually-provided tools.
35
  Here 
the boundary between recovery and resolution may be less distinct, since both rely on 
contractual tools, but resolution action has all the benefits of contractual certainty.
36
  On the 
other hand, contractual certainty may be an illusion if resolution, or indeed recovery, is 
viewed as a public action, with all the consequences that has for the applicability of the law 
of public administration, as discussed further below.  
 
4.2  Should tear-up be the final step in the waterfall? 
The second question concerns a rule used to manage defaults.  ‘Tear-up’ is the power for the 
clearing house to terminate contracts and settle them at a price it determines.  ‘Full tear-up’ 
involves all the contracts in a given clearing service, while ‘partial tear-up’ terminates only a 
subset of them.  Tear-up is the ultimate tool for managing a clearing member default, in that 
if it can be applied to all the contracts opposite the defaulter, the result will always be a 
matched book.  However, tear-up inevitably involves market disruption and would likely 
                                                             
35
 There is also a related issue that certain legal protections are accorded to resolution actions: if the RA acts 
using the CCP’s rules rather than statutory powers, there is some risk that that action is judged not to be a 
resolution action, and hence not protected.  
36
 There may also be further benefits in that use of resolution tools can be assumed to happen before bankruptcy, 
so it may make framing the creditor safeguard somewhat easier.  See the discussion in sections 4.4 and 5.4 
below.  
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cause a loss of confidence were it to be deployed as a default management tool, so it should 
not be invoked lightly. 
Many clearing services have full tear-up as a power available to the CCP, although it 
has not often been used.
37
  One aspect of it that is particularly troubling to clearing members 
and clients is that any default loss can be allocated to them depending on the setting of the 
tear-up price: for instance, if the CCP tears up positions opposite the defaulter at the price at 
which the last successful margin call was made, there are no losses to the clearing service.  In 
this way, the default management problem, and the losses involved in it, have been passed on 
by tear-up. 
This possibility means that if a CCP has the power of tear-up and full control over the 
tear-up price, it cannot fail due to default risk.  However, just because the CCP is left 
standing after a default event or events does not mean that continuity of clearing provision is 
assured, not least because many market participants might be unwilling to use a service 
which had used tear-up to recover.  The policy questions are therefore whether tear-up should 
be present in CCP recovery rules, whether it should be available only in resolution (where 
presumably there is less of a risk of the price being set to protect CCP shareholders), or 
whether its use should be banned in default management.  
 
                                                             
37
 Tear-up is typically used to address market disruption.  It has however also been used as a CCP recovery tool: 
see E Budding, R Cox, D Murphy, Central counterparties in crisis: the International Commodities Clearing 
House, New Zealand Futures and Options Exchange and the Stephen Francis Affair, (2016) 4(3) Journal of 
Financial Market Infrastructure 65 detailing an episode where tear-up was used as both a book balancing and a 
loss allocation tool. 
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4.3  When should resolution be triggered? 
Resolution triggers (such as judging the moment when a CCP is ‘likely to fail’) are 
necessarily subjective.  However, this means that in any given situation of CCP stress, 
opinions may differ as to whether confidence has been lost, whether financial stability is 
threatened, and whether the CCP’s own actions would, if allowed to proceed, stabilise the 
entity.  There are two types of challenge associated with this issue.  The first is for the 
drafters of legislation in deciding how much discretion to afford to the RA.  The second is for 
the RAs themselves when deciding, within their statutory powers, on the moment to trigger 
resolution.  The latter type of challenge can be illustrated by considering the recovery steps in 
Figure 2 and the possibility of a resolution action during each of them, as explained by Figure 
3. 
Clearly if authorities trigger ‘early’, before many of the CCP’s financial resources are 
used in what may ultimately be ineffective risk management, they risk the challenge that they 
have unjustifiably interfered with CCP shareholders’ property rights (as explored further in 
section 5); but if they wait, resources may be wasted and costs may be higher.  Early 
resolution could also address a loss of market confidence in the CCP before contagion sets in, 
decreasing risks to financial stability.  The policy questions are therefore around the nature of 
the triggers that should be included in legislation and how they might be used in practice.  
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Cause of stress Recovery Resolution triggered? 
Default  Balancing book/managing 
default 
‘Early’ resolution before book is 
matched 
Absorbing default losses ‘Mid period’ resolution once the loss 
is known because loss absorbing 
resources are insufficient or cannot be 
refilled 
Refilling default resources 
Non-default Determining the size of a non-
default loss and preventing 
further losses 
‘Early’ resolution before the total loss 
is known 
Absorbing the loss ‘Mid period’ resolution once the loss 
is known because loss absorbing 
resources are insufficient or cannot be 
refilled 
Any Recapitalising the CCP ‘Late’ resolution because confidence 
has been lost 
Figure 3 — Illustration of the timing of resolution action 
4.4  How should the safeguard against arbitrary action by RAs be framed? 
We have already seen that the resolution of a systemically important clearing service involves 
a large enough risk to financial stability that it should not be attempted without a 
comprehensive toolkit, so RAs need to have substantial powers.  In particular they need 
additional tools over those available in recovery, as otherwise there may be no reason to 
believe that an authority-led resolution will be successful where a CCP-led recovery has 
failed.  Thus a key component of the proposed resolution toolkit in both default and non-
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default
38
 stresses is a mechanism for RAs to acquire extra resources to absorb losses and refill 
the CCP’s financial resources, such as a RA call.  It is proposed that RAs will also have other 
powers, perhaps including tear-up and the ability to haircut variation margin gains.  
It follows that private sector stakeholders will typically support some constraint on the use of 
these powers.  In bank resolution, one important constraint is the NCWO principle.  This 
safeguard means that any creditor who is worse off in resolution than they would have been 
in bankruptcy has a claim against the Treasury (which may, in this context, seek a 
contribution from the industry-funded Financial Services Compensation Scheme) for the 
difference, which is calculated by an independent valuer.
39
  
However, to be useful, a creditor safeguard must be susceptible to calculation at the 
point of resolution so that the authority can know what the maximum loss it can allocate is at 
the point of allocation.  If a pure NCWO-in-bankruptcy safeguard is applied in the CCP 
context, difficulties will arise where authorities wish to intervene in a systemic CCP well 
before the point of insolvency (especially if they wish to avoid the use of tear-up discussed 
above).  Therefore the question is how a safeguard on losses allocated to each creditor should 
be framed so that it is effective, protects property rights and can be estimated at the point of 
resolution.  
 
4.5  What is the role of CCP equity holders in recovery and resolution? 
In a bank resolution, equity is the first resource in line to absorb losses, and equity holders 
will also suffer substantial dilution or write-down, especially if debt instruments senior to 
                                                             
38
 Arguably a mechanism to provide extra resources in non-default stress is even more important that in default 
stress, as the default waterfall in recovery is typically much deeper than the non-default one. 
39
 As described in G Davies and M Dobler, Bank resolution and safeguarding the creditors left behind (Q3, 
2011) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 213, Part 2. 
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them are ‘bailed in’ in order to recapitalise the bank.  CCPs are not banks, and in particular 
the structure of loss absorbing resources in a CCP involves clearing members.  Therefore, the 
question arises of whether CCP resolution should follow the bank model, and allocated losses 
to CCP shareholders, with new equity being provided to those who contributed resources to 
the resolution, or whether some other approach should be taken. 
 
5.  CCP RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION: LEGAL CHALLENGES 
This section analyses the potential for legal challenges during the recovery and resolution of a 
CCP, focusing on the five key questions above. As outlined in Figure 1, legal challenges are 
likely to target specific rules, for example those set out in the CCP rule book, but by doing so, 
they may also have an impact on policy at a more general level. The effects of a legal 
challenge may therefore be wide-ranging, affecting many stakeholders beyond those directly 
involved in the original dispute or in any subsequent litigation.  
Given that the final form of CCP recovery and resolution rules remains work in 
progress, the discussion considers the issues at a high-level rather than commenting in 
particular draft rules.  Moreover, in the absence of finalised rules or of any significant case 
law from the CCP sector itself, the analysis is informed by three analogous and more 
developed areas of law. These are, first, the law around defaults, netting and insolvency under 
bilateral OTC derivatives; secondly, the debate around the legal robustness of a CCP’s 
processes for managing the defaults of its members; and, thirdly, the recent history of 
litigation around the recovery and resolution of banks.  
The analysis focuses on the position under English law both in terms of the affected 
CCP and the analogous areas above, whilst acknowledging that in practice the position even 
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in the UK would be complicated by the global nature of transactions and participants in the 
derivatives market.
40
    
 
5.1  How should Recovery Rules be framed? 
The first policy question is whether and to what extent recovery and resolution tools should 
be provided for expressly in legislation, or implemented through CCPs’ rule books.  This 
section considers the legal challenges which may arise in the case of recovery.  Sections 5.3 
and 5.5 below review the position should a resolution become necessary.  
Recovery tools are primarily designed to avoid the need for resolution of the CCP,
41
 
typically by shifting losses from the CCP to third parties, including members and their clients 
and indirectly, to stakeholders in these members and clients.  The reciprocal benefit for 
members bearing such losses is the continuity of the clearing service, and avoiding the 
instability, disruption and potentially far greater risks and losses associated with resolution.  
Recovery and continuity benefit other parties too; most obviously the CCP itself, its owners 
who would bear the brunt of the conversion and write-down tools during resolution, and also 
the wider financial system.  
As discussed in section 3.1, recovery may be thought of as the private or ‘in-house’ 
rescue of a stressed CCP, because the tools used are those provided for in the CCP’s own rule 
book and because the resources involved come from the CCP’s members and their clients.  
For both these reasons, however, recovery is vulnerable to challenges from members and, 
                                                             
40
 By way of example, see (n 80) and accompanying text, for discussion of an interim application heard by the 
English courts following the administration of MF Global, which was complicated by jurisdictional and cross-
border legal issues.  
41
 See, for example, ISDA, CCP loss allocation beyond the default waterfall (August 2013), 7: ‘The primary 
goal should be recovery and continuity rather than resolution.’ 
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indeed, in extreme cases members may decide that the benefits of recovery do not outweigh 
the burdens and therefore choose not co-operate and risk default themselves.  Specifically, 
there are three main types of challenge that a member may bring in the context of a CCP’s 
use of recovery tools
42
 which may be understood as a combination of private and public law-
based actions.  
 
5.1.1  Private law challenges  
Members may challenge a CCP’s recovery plan on the basis of contract law, claiming, for 
example, that the provisions in the CCP rule book are not clear or complete or that the CCP is 
in breach of them.  The recovery rules are particularly at risk if they are ambiguous or silent 
on a particular matter.  This type of challenge would delay and disrupt the recovery plan, and 
potentially undermine the ability of the CCP to avoid resolution, thereby deepening losses 
and exposing a broader range of parties to disruption and loss.  
If recovery plans were governed in detail by statute this may minimise, but not 
necessarily preclude, such challenges because there still may be ambiguities or gaps.  Recent 
litigation in the bilateral derivatives market has included similar challenges to a widely used 
standard contract where a contract was silent (for example, where the ISDA Master 
Agreement did not provide for what should happen when an ‘in the money’ party was 
affected by an Event of Default that was not possible to cure)
43
 and where it was unclear what 
the words in the contract meant (for example, a $1 billion dispute arose about whether the 
‘material terms’ which had to be taken into account in calculating the ‘Close-out Amount’ 
                                                             
42
 The statutory protections afforded to CCPs’ default rules under English law may protect a CCP from 
challenges to its recovery plans. In particular, Part VII of the Companies Act 1989 is relevant here. However, 
the nature of these protections is beyond the scope of this paper.  
43
 Lomas & Ors v JFB Firth Rixson & Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 419. 
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under the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement included the value of a side letter).
44
  In such cases, 
the courts will objectively seek ‘to determine what the parties meant by the language used’,45 
and where there is more than one possible meaning, the law ‘generally favours a 
commercially sensible interpretation.’46  However, the courts will not try to rescue a poorly 
drafted or unfair clause, and nor will they attempt to identify and impose what the parties 
should have agreed.
47
  Recent case law has suggested that the courts are becoming even 
stricter on this point.
48
  Similarly, it is very rare that an omission or gap in a sophisticated 
contract like a CCP’s membership agreement will be filled in by the courts.49  Nor will the 
courts repair defective wording, even in order to achieve its commercial purpose, or 
ordinarily take into account the wider policy or regulatory context behind a particular term 
which is being disputed.
50
   
This means that, if a CCP has failed to provide workable recovery plan in its rule 
book, it will not be able to rely on the courts to correct these sorts of issues.  This would 
matter, for example, if a recovery plan did not cover the steps needed to address a particular 
                                                             
44
 Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v Lehman Brothers Finance [2012] EWHC 1072(Ch).  
45
 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 at [14]. 
46
 GSO v Barclays [2016] EWHC 146 (Comm) at [24], referencing Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life 
Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749 at 771.  
47
 Arnold v Britton and ors [2015] UKSC 36.  
48
 Ibid.  
49
 Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas [2015] UKSC 72 at [29].  
50
 See also BNY Mellon Corp v LBG Capital no 1 plc [2016] UKSC 29 at [30] where the Supreme Court 
confirmed that ‘very considerable circumspection is appropriate before the contents of such other documents are 
taken into account’ when interpreting a contractual term. Here, by majority, the Court found an exception and 
decided that it was appropriate to consider FSA regulatory documents which influenced the design of contingent 
convertible bonds issued by Lloyd’s Bank in 2009.  
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distress scenario.
51
  In such a case it is highly unlikely for the plan to be rescued by the 
courts.  
Secondly, a litigious CCP member may rely, by analogy, on case law generated in the 
bilateral OTC derivatives market, particularly around close-out under the ISDA Master 
Agreement, in order to argue that any discretionary powers the CCP has in its agreement with 
members must be exercised reasonably, or, as the courts have put it, in accordance with a 
duty of ‘rationality’.52   This requires that the CCP will have to act honestly, not arbitrarily 
and within its contractual powers.
53
  While this may trigger a detailed technical review of the 
grounds for a particular decision taken by the CCP, ultimately the standard is not an onerous 
one provided that the stated processes are followed.  The cases are clear that courts will not 
second-guess properly constituted decision-making, and the CCP will be entitled to act in its 
own interests subject to these broad constraints. 
 
5.1.2  Public law challenges  
A member or other affected stakeholder might, however, take an entirely different course to 
that outlined above, arguing that the CCP exercising its recovery plan should be held to 
public law-like standards
54
 and that it should be subject to the ‘judicial review’ process, 
where the courts exercise their ‘supervisory jurisdiction in public law’.55  This is a ‘collateral 
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 LCH.Clearnet (n 34) 6-7 includes nine different scenarios which may trigger risk at a CCP. 
52
 Socimer v Standard Bank; Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2015] EWHC 1307 (Ch).  
53
 Sometimes this standard is framed by reference to the grounds applied in a judicial review. See section 5.1.4 
for further discussion of such grounds.  
54
 The convergence between public and private standards is explored in detail in D Oliver, Common Values and 
the Public-Private Divide (CUP, 1999).  
55
 Ibid, 38. 
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challenge’ to the decision-making process.56  Usually, the courts use judicial review to 
supervise public bodies, but this supervision can be extended to private entities which are 
exercising public functions.   
Though it is difficult to predict how this notoriously ‘slippery’57 area of law may 
apply to a CCP, this type of challenge is a possibility, representing a relatively complex, 
unfamiliar and technical type of legal challenge for the CCP to deal with during the recovery 
process.  The two pivotal questions about judicial review are considered below. It is also 
worth noting that judicial review can be a basis of a challenge by stakeholders other than 
CCP members such as clients of clearing members, and also possibly other FMI entities and 
service providers exposed to the effects of a stressed CCP.
58
  For this reason, judicial review 
may also be a risk during the resolution processes where a greater range of stakeholders face 
losses.  
 
5.1.3  When would Judicial Review apply?  
Whether a particular private entity is ‘amenable’ to judicial review is not clear-cut.  This was 
demonstrated by a recent case considering the position of accountancy firm KPMG, where 
the court said that this question is ‘not always easily answered’.59  Broadly, amenability does 
not depend on the source of an entity’s power being public60 but rather it depends on the 
nature of the power the body is exercising and whether it is public in character.  So, for 
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 In Re Preston [1985] 1 A.C. 835, 852 (Lord Scarman).  
57
 Professor Rawlings describes judicial review as a ‘slippery concept’: R Rawlings, Modelling Judicial Review, 
(2008) Current Legal Problems 95, 95.  
58
 For an overview of the network of FMI relationships and the interconnectedness of CCPs with banks and 
other FMI, see The Bank of England, The Bank of England’s supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures, 
(March 2016) at 7-8.  
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example, an entity may be liable to judicial review ‘if it has been woven into the fabric of 
public regulation or into a system of governmental control or is integrated into a system of 
statutory regulation or is a surrogate organ of government or but for its existence a 
governmental body would assume control …’61  This requires a ‘careful analysis of the 
function in issue’,62 which test has been described as ‘broad’ and ‘question-begging’.63  
There are no cases directly considering whether a CCP would be considered amenable to 
judicial review.  Analogies are of limited use on a fact-specific question, but there are two 
useful recent examples.   
First, there are several cases where the London Metal Exchange (‘LME’), in its 
capacity as a recognised investment exchange, has been treated as a public body, including 
where it was held to judicial review standards when consulting on and carrying out a rule 
change.  R (United Co Rusal plc) v London Metal Exchange,
64
 involved a challenge on the 
basis of the duty to act fairly during a consultation.  On appeal, the LME was held liable to 
this standard, but found to have acted fairly.  Neither the Court of Appeal or the first instance 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
59
 R (Holmcroft Properties Ltd) v KPMG LLP and ors [2016] EWHC 323 (Admin), at [23] (Elias LJ and Mitting 
J).  
60
 R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 815. 
61
 R v Jockey Club ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909, cited at R (Holmcroft Properties Ltd) v KPMG LLP 
and ors [2016] EWHC 323 (Admin), at [27] (Elias LJ and Mitting J). Internal references omitted from the quote.  
62
 R (Holmcroft Properties Ltd) v KPMG LLP and ors [2016] EWHC 323 (Admin), at [26] (Elias LJ and Mitting 
J).  
63
 R(Beer) v Hampshire Farmers Markets Ltd [2004] 1 WLR 233, at [16] (Dyson LJ) quoted at R (Holmcroft 
Properties Ltd) v KPMG LLP and ors [2016] EWHC 323 (Admin), at [26] (Elias LJ and Mitting J).  
64
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1271, overturning [2014] EWHC 890 (Admin) on whether the LME had fallen short of its 
public law obligations, though both cases assumed that the LME was amenable the judicial review in the first 
place. 
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decision elaborates on why the LME is considered amenable to judicial review, but the latter 
states as part of the factual background that 
 
The LME is a Recognised Investment Exchange (‘RIE’) within the meaning of 
section 285 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
65
 
 
This legislation covers different types of financial market infrastructure, and while the quoted 
section 285(1)(a) covers RIEs, section 285(1)(b) covers a ‘recognised clearing house’ and 
section 285(3A) covers a ‘recognised central counterparty’, suggesting a close parallel 
between the two types of entities for these purposes.  There is also a link in the fact that the 
same regulatory regime imposes the duty on the LME as a RIE to have ‘proper procedures’ 
(which was relevant in this case)
 66
 and obliges a CCP as a recognised clearing house to have 
a recovery plan.
67
  
Conversely, in a decision that the court acknowledged was a finely balanced one, a 
private firm taking part in regulatory scheme was found not to be amendable to judicial 
review.  In this case, the purchaser of an interest rate hedging product which had been mis-
sold by Barclays Bank, failed in his attempt to extend judicial review to the accountancy firm 
KPMG, which was acting as the ‘skilled person’ in the Financial Conduct Authority 
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 [2014] EWHC 890 (Admin) at [7].  
66
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1271 at [25]: Part of the relevant factual background to the LME case was held to be: 
‘Paragraph 7 of the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Recognition Requirements for 
Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/995) [which] imposes a duty on the 
LME to have proper procedures for amending its rules, including procedures for continuing use of the market’.  
67
 Section 29B of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Recognition Requirements for Investment 
Exchanges and Clearing Houses) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/995) simply states that a central counterparty must 
have a recovery plan.  
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(‘FCA’)’s mis-selling compensation scheme.68  The court acknowledged that this was a 
difficult decision, not arrived at ‘without some hesitation’.69  It was ultimately persuaded by 
factors including that KPMG was appointed by Barclays as part of a voluntary scheme of 
redress imposed by the FCA, that KPMG’s powers were conferred by contract, and that it 
was not carrying out a role which the FCA would have otherwise undertaken itself.
70
  A 
CCP’s relationship with its members is based on private agreement, as KPMG’s was.  While 
this clearly does not preclude judicial review, it is not the usual background to it.
71
  However, 
this would not be a factor if judicial review was brought by stakeholders without the right to 
sue a CCP in contract, such as clients of clearing members.  
One of the factors that the court may take into account at this stage is whether the 
entity in question has ‘statutory underpinning’ which includes the position where ‘the 
government … has woven the body into the fabric of public regulation…’.72  This may prove 
a powerful factor in favour of amenability now that the use of CCPs is mandatory under 
legislation including EMIR, and that they have expressly been given the function of 
protecting financial market stability. Reinforcing this argument is the fact that there is a 
statutory sanction under EMIR if a financial counterparty (or non-financial counterparty in 
certain circumstances) does not use a CCP to clear eligible contracts.  Overall, this suggests 
that there is more of a public element in a CCP’s role than there was in KPMG’s in the case 
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 R (Holmcroft Properties Ltd) v KPMG LLP and ors [2016] EWHC 323 (Admin). 
69
 Ibid at [41] (Elias LJ and Mitting J).  
70
 These factors are discussed ibid at [42]-[47]. 
71
 Usually, judicial review is not be available where parties have a right to sue in contract, on the basis that it 
should be a remedy of last resort, but there are some exceptions. See Woolf et al (eds), De Smith’s Judicial 
Review (7
th
 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) 3-056.  
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 Ibid, 3-044. 
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above, and that actions under a recovery plan may therefore be reviewable, in particular if 
there are detailed requirements in finalised legislation.  
 
5.1.4  The implications of Judicial Review  
Judicial review would involve close scrutiny of a CCP’s decision-making process against 
particular grounds.  In the LME’s case, for example, the scrutiny focused on whether the 
LME should have explained its reasons for rejecting certain proposals which were not 
consulted on, and whether the information it provided in its consultation was sufficient.   
The various grounds for judicial review include the rights set out in the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Wednesbury test of unreasonableness,
73
 which has been described 
as having two elements:  
 firstly, checking the decision-making process against procedural factors, such as 
fairness. This may involve (depending on the facts in a particular case) checking if the 
body has taken relevant considerations into account, if it has met legitimate 
expectations which it has created though its actions, and if it has made any 
inconsistent decisions; and 
 secondly, this test provides ‘a safety net, [and a] control for extreme 
unreasonableness’, for example, it checks to see if a body has exceeded its powers.74 
 
In any given case, the applicable standards will reflect the terms under which the entity is 
operating. In the context of a CCP implementing its recovery plan, the applicable standards 
would likely reference the relevant functions and responsibilities which applied to CCPs in 
EU and UK legislation, the wider public policy objectives relating to financial stability, and 
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the contractual framework within which a CCP operates as regards its members. So, for 
example, a claimant may allege that a CCP had gone beyond its powers by acting 
unreasonably in making a capital call, or in implementing recovery plans in scenarios where 
they were not meant to be used.  
If judicial review were allowed, the court would have a range of ‘distinctive’ remedies 
available.
75
  Reflecting the fact that this is a claim about the decision-making process, these 
remedies are different to those available under private law (which are usually damages).  
Interim remedies include an injunction to preserve the status quo (eg, to prevent a capital call 
or an auction from taking place).  Final remedies, at the end of a full trial, would depend on 
the nature of the harm, but may include a mandatory order that the body takes a particular 
action; an order quashing a decision or remitting the matter back to the decision-maker, or a 
formal statement of the legal position of the parties.
76
  In the LME case discussed above, the 
court of first instance held that the LME’s consultation process was flawed, and as a result, it 
quashed the decision which the LME had arrived after the consultation.  In Willard, the court 
of first instance quashed a decision notice issued by the FSA’s Regulatory Determinations 
Committee.
77
 Therefore, judicial review may lead to a CCP’s decision to use certain recovery 
tools being quashed by a court or an order that forces it to take a particular action, such as 
rescinding a decision to allocate losses in a particular manner.  The impact of a decision on 
these lines would clearly have the potential to be market-wide. It would have to be taken into 
account by other CCPs in amending their own recovery rules and decision-making processes, 
and it might even elicit reform at a policy level, for example on the extent to which recovery 
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processes were underpinned by statute and the prescribed roles of regulators and CCP 
management during a recovery.  
 
5.2  Should tear-up be the final step in the waterfall? 
Section 4.2 above considered the nature of tear-up, whereby open positions are terminated by  
the CCP and the value of gains or losses used as the basis of a cash settlement.  On the one 
hand, tear-up is a flexible and valuable tool.  Selective tear-up may  allow a CCP to offer a 
qualified version of continuity of service and, in extremis, full tear-up may allow the CCP to 
avoid insolvency.  On the other, its use comes at a heavy price.  Tear-up burdens non-
defaulting members and their clients.  It is a more disruptive and potentially destabilising tool 
than other options available to a CCP, because it terminates positions, cutting across the core 
benefits which a CCP offers a market, namely, certainty and stability around the management 
of cleared contracts.  A full tear-up also terminates all cleared contracts, leaving no cleared 
claims (at least from the torn-up service) on the CCP legal entity.  
For these reasons, tear-up needs to be precisely provided for in the CCP’s rule books 
and needs to be conducted with considerable caution.  More specifically, rules providing for 
tear-up should reflect the fact that there are potentially three, inter-linked risks arising from 
the use of tear-up and these risks expose a CCP using tear-up to challenges from members in 
particular. Two types of risk are considered here, and the third (relating to the loss of property 
rights involved) is considered as part of the discussion around the safeguarding stakeholders’ 
property rights from arbitrary action, in section 5.5 below.  
First, tear-up is vulnerable to challenges based on the CCP’s right to use it in the first 
place.  An affected member might claim that the CCP’s decision-making was unlawful or 
illegitimate in some way, perhaps because it exceeded the powers set out in its rule book, or 
because it failed to satisfy various defined pre-conditions to a tear-up.  This line of argument 
 38 
focuses on the use of tear-up as a default management tool (rather than the price).  One way 
of mitigating this risk for CCPs would be to introduce a rule that the use of tear-up as a 
default management tool requires permission from the CCP’s supervisory authority. This 
would delay the process, and it would involve a risk for that authority, as it could be 
challenged itself, but such a rule would offer protection for the CCP and a safety-check for 
the members affected.  It would also enable the authority to evaluate if the disruption to 
affected members was outweighed by the financial stability gains from the tear-up exercise.  
Secondly, there may be challenges from members or other affected parties based on 
the price at which a contract is valued when it is torn up.  This is especially the case if there is 
a requirement (as some draft rules propose) that tear-up should not be used for loss allocation 
purposes, because here there is an implicit requirement that the tear-up price is ‘fair’.  This is 
because establishing a ‘fair’ price in the turbulent markets around a major clearing member 
default may be problematic.  Moreover, it is possible to imagine that a CCP or its RA sets a 
price for tear-up, only to find that the affected contracts rally strongly thereafter: even 
without a ‘no loss allocation’ requirement, this fact pattern might be unfortunate.   
Challenges to the tear-up price could be on the basis that the CCP (or the RA) has breached 
the terms of the rule book, or that it failed to exercised its discretion reasonably.  A 
contractual claim would mirror, and would very likely draw upon, litigation around the 
valuation process on the termination of OTC derivatives due to the default of one of the 
parties.
78
  However, in general, this litigation demonstrates that the courts are inclined to 
allow parties with a contractual right to set a price a broad discretion.
79
  A challenge on 
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similar facts was recently brought in the context of a clearing house’s close out of a 
defaulting member’s positions, but it failed to get off the ground on that occasion.80   
 Assuming that the CCP was amenable to judicial review (as discussed above) it may 
also face an action around its price-setting process.  This may be brought by a member, but it 
could also be brought by other stakeholders, such as a client of a non-defaulting member 
adversely impacted by tear-up, or an indirect client further down the clearing chain, or even 
more remote stakeholders which suffered loss due to the CCP’s actions during a recovery 
such as another FMI or service provider.
81
 Once again, though the immediate subject matter 
of these challenges would be the rules and actions of a particular CCP, it would be likely that 
this sort of challenge would impact other CCPs indirectly, to the extent that their recovery 
and resolution plans also involved tear-up. 
 
5.3  When should resolution be triggered? 
Even though there is a strong public interest in the successful outcome of CCP recovery 
processes and regulators may be closely involved, the processes described so far are 
essentially private.  This is because they are conducted by the CCP management according to 
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the CCP’s own rules and aimed at sharing losses amongst its own membership.  At the onset 
of resolution, however, the CCP forfeits this autonomy to the public sector RA, whose 
extensive powers will impact a far broader range of stakeholders than those considered so far.  
In legal terms, the technical details around the trigger for resolution are almost 
inevitably source of tension between different parties, given what is at stake.  In practice, 
much will depend on the design of underlying legislation and, in particular, on the discretion 
allowed to the RAs. Regulators tend to prefer regimes which allow them discretion to trigger 
resolution for wider financial stability reasons as well as in the case of narrower, micro-
prudential problems relating to CCP solvency or liquidity.
82
  This sort of regime might allow 
the RA to step in before the default waterfall was exhausted and recovery tools applied.
83
  
Meanwhile, CCPs (and sometimes their users) argue for a regime which allows for the 
‘possibility of a CCP-led recovery to continue’,84 and for rules which  ‘maximize certainty 
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and predictability and maintain market confidence’.85  In particular, this line of argument 
asserts that ‘the indicators for a resolution authority intervention should be defined upfront’.86 
The financial institution resolution regimes implemented to date usually include 
extensive discretion for the authorities to decide when to trigger resolution, so it seems likely 
that the former view, preferred by the authorities, will prevail for CCPs too.  Moreover, the 
fact that a RA is obliged to pursue certain statutory resolution objectives, such as achieving 
continuity of critical economic functions, avoiding disruption to market participants and 
safeguarding financial stability
87
 means that it will be trying to act before an actual failure, 
and while there are still loss absorbing resources left in the CCP.  However, the use of 
discretion in such a high-stakes setting raises the question of potential challenges and legal 
safeguards against arbitrary actions by RAs.  This reflects the difficulty of striking a balance 
between those parties with direct claims against the stressed CCP, whether as members, 
equity holders or other creditors, and the broader public interest in avoiding costs for 
taxpayers and minimising disruption to the financial system.  
As the RA navigates these different interests in order to decide when to trigger 
resolution, it is wielding powers granted to it by statute (whether or not the powers it then 
goes on to exercise are found in the CCP rule book or in statute).  This means that the RA’s 
amenability to judicial review is much clearer than in the case of the CCP, considered above.  
By way of analogy, the FCA
88
 and the Treasury Commission
89
 have both been held to 
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account (in different settings) in this way.  In this context, potential claimants could include 
the CCP itself, its members, clients of members and wider stakeholders with standing.  
Potential grounds for review may be that the RA exceeded or abused its powers at this 
point,
 90
 or that there has been a violation of the claimant’s right to property under Article 1, 
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘A1P1’). Former shareholders of 
Northern Rock put forward A1P1 as the basis for their judicial review challenge to the 
Treasury’s decision on valuation.  This case is considered in section 5.5 below, but it 
confirms that a challenge is possible in the context of a special resolution regime; that 
property such as shares qualify for A1P1 purposes; but also that the UK courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights agree that a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ will permit a 
public body to compromise individuals’ property rights in the interests of wider financial 
stability.
91
  
 
5.4  How should the safeguard against arbitrary action by RAs be framed? 
An important objective of recovery and resolution regimes is to avoid the risk of a taxpayer-
funded bailout of systemically important financial institutions.  One way in which this is 
achieved is that equity and other claim holders may be required to bear the burden of losses 
through conversion and write-down tools (allowing the ‘bail-in’, rather than ‘bail-out’, of a 
failing institution). However, the extent of these stakeholders’ losses is limited by a various 
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exemptions (eg, to creditors who are employees) and safeguards.  The public interest is 
therefore not allowed to prevail unchecked.   
In the context of banks, the safeguard question is principally addressed by allowing 
any creditor who loses more in resolution than they would have lost in insolvency to claim 
compensation from the State.  This NCWO safeguard acts as a constraint on arbitrary 
property transfer by the RA.  It is designed to reassure creditors and it also ‘allows the 
resolution authority to act more swiftly and decisively in the knowledge that actions that 
might otherwise upset the ranking of creditors in insolvency can be offset by 
compensation.’92  In the banking context, the sum payable will be calculated by an 
independent valuer as the difference between the sum recovered and the estimated recovery 
had the special resolution tools not been used and the bank entered insolvency (the 
‘counterfactual’).  While this creditor protection is paid by the State, a portion of these funds 
may be recouped from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (‘FSCS’), the scheme 
which insures depositors and which is funded by contributions by FCA and PRA regulated 
financial firms.  This is because on the counterfactual the FSCS would have had to pay out to 
insured depositors.  
The issue is more nuanced for clearing houses in several respects:  
 If tear-up is available under the CCP rule book, much turns on whether the 
counterfactual assumes its use or not.  If the CCP has full discretion to set the tear-up 
price, then it is almost impossible for it to fail due to member defaults, and hence to 
be bankrupt.  This makes NCWO-in-bankruptcy an unhelpful counterfactual as the 
only claims on the CCP legal entity after full tear-up would be non-cleared ones. 
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 In bankruptcy, all remaining claims on the CCP legal entity at the same level in the 
creditor hierarchy would net.  As discussed in section 1.5, there are potentially claims 
from one or more clearing services, from CCP investment activity, and from other 
areas of its business (such as other group companies).  This again makes NCWO-in-
bankruptcy problematic as authorities could not keep clearing claims in different 
services separate and distinct from other claims. 
 It is easily possible to imagine circumstances where the RA may wish to conduct an 
‘early’ resolution before the full cost of balancing the CCP’s book is known.  In this 
case it will be unknown at the point of resolution whether the CCP is solvent or not, 
even without the potential for tear-up.  Authorities will typically want an NCWO 
counterfactual which can be calculated at the point of resolution, so that they are fully 
cognisant of the limits it imposes on resolution actions: clearly NCWO-in-bankruptcy 
does not meet this criteria if it is unclear whether the equity of the entity being 
resolved has any value.   
 In the context of a CCP resolution, there is no equivalent of the FSCS to reimburse 
the State.  Given the small number of CCPs compared to the number of FCA and 
PRA regulated firms, having a mutualised fund of this nature in the clearing sector is 
problematic, with the result that the State remains more exposed compared to the 
position in banking sector.  
 It is unlikely that an independent valuer would be able to value positions held by the 
CCP quickly, or at least that it would be able to do so in a way that was fully 
‘independent’ from the CCP’s own calculations.  Thus, an independent valuation of 
the ‘true’ value of an unbalanced book may well not be available at the point of 
resolution. 
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In sum, creditors, the RA and taxpayers alike have a strong interest in understanding exactly 
how a NCWO safeguard will work in practice and how it should be calculated at any likely 
point of resolution.  Otherwise the safeguard may hinder the RA and make creditor 
challenges more likely.  The NCWO safeguard must therefore be drafted so that it references 
counterfactual criteria which are knowable at the point of resolution.  It must be clear and 
workable for the particular context of a CCP, so that its operation does not invite challenges 
to the RA or to the independent valuer, whether on the basis of judicial review or otherwise.   
 
5.5  What is the role of CCP equity holders in recovery and resolution? 
Under bank resolution, the holders of claims on the entity being resolved could be ‘bailed in’.  
When these tools are used, the same order of priority applies as on a corporate insolvency, ie, 
equity would be the first tier to suffer losses.  Some proposals for CCP resolution adopt a 
similar approach, with CCP equity being exposed to losses, and CCP recapitalisation (if 
needed) diluting existing shareholders.  Clearly a CCP equity holder could face significant 
losses in resolution. 
In the banking context, litigation has been brought by parties in this position.  Former 
shareholders of Northern Rock brought a claim for judicial review challenging the basis on 
which their shares were valued on the bank’s 2008 nationalisation.  Their challenge was 
brought on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights’ protection of private 
property which provides that  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
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the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international 
law...
93
 
 
This Article requires a balance be struck between the interests of the public and the protection 
of the individual’s rights.  The Court of Appeal confirmed that this balance is to be struck by 
reference to two governing principles: proportionality and the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation.
94
  The question in the Northern Rock case was whether the balance between 
public interest and private property rights required the shareholders to be compensated by the 
Treasury on the basis that ‘lender of last resort’ financial assistance was provided by the 
Bank of England, or on the assumption that it had been withdrawn and was not available in 
the future (which would value the shares at a negligible sum). 
Upholding the first instance decision, the Court of Appeal rejected the shareholders’ 
claim.  It found that the nationalisation process was lawful, entirely ‘for the protection of the 
banking system (and thus the general economy) as a whole’95 and in these circumstances, the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the State should be a wide one.  The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), to which the shareholders then appealed, agreed with the Court of 
Appeal that in the context of the exceptional circumstances across the financial sector at the 
relevant time ‘a wide margin of appreciation is appropriate’ in order to manage systemic 
risk.
96
 It also confirmed that the valuation without reference to lender of last resort support 
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was justified to avoid moral hazard in the future.
97
 The shareholders should not, therefore, 
benefit from the actions of the lender of last resort.
98
 
The Northern Rock litigation was long-running (with ECtHR decision coming four 
years after the bank was nationalised), and it demonstrates how judicial review on the basis of 
the right to property might be invoked by creditors or shareholders in the course of the 
authorities’ handling of CCP’s resolution. Notably, a challenge based on property rights 
would be very likely to cause delay, as such cases may take years to resolve and may affect a 
broad class of stakeholders. This delay presents risks for a CCP’s recovery and resolution 
process in its own right, especially in light of the objective of continuity. Looking ahead, 
however, the actual outcome of the Northern Rock case is a constructive one for authorities 
which act properly and within their powers, for CCPs in recovery and resolution, and 
certainly from the perspective of the wider public interest. This is particularly because of the 
wide margin of appreciation afforded to the authorities in the UK and European courts, and 
also because of way in which the Court of Appeal’s analysis, in particular, gives great weight 
to the fact that the relevant actions were taken with the strategic goal of protecting the public 
interest. This decision should give regulators confidence when deploying resolution tools 
which are designed to promote financial stability, but which may do so at the expense of the 
property rights of shareholders, creditors and others parties exposed to a failing CCP. 
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6.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The idealised model of public policy development set out in section 2 helps to understand the 
considerable amounts of regulation which have been imposed on the OTC derivatives market 
since the financial crisis.  Applying this model, the paper has set out how new, over-riding 
objectives reflecting the interests of a more extensive set of stakeholders and intended to 
uphold the public interest have shaped the radical reforms to this sector.  It has also explained 
how these over-riding objectives require a new regime to provide for CCP recovery and 
resolution.  
We have shown that key questions in the design of public policy may be usefully 
analysed as conflicts of stakeholders’ rights.  Anticipating the legal challenges which may be 
brought by various stakeholders at this point of the policy process helps to refine and fortify 
rules before they are implemented.  On this basis, the paper considered five contested points 
questions in CCP recovery and resolution policy.  Specifically building on the analysis in 
sections 4 and 5, we offer the following policy insights.  
 
6.1  Framing recovery and resolution rules 
The use of the CCP rule book to implement public policy is in some ways an operationally 
neat solution.  In particular, having clearing members agree to the resolution toolkit as a 
condition of membership increases clarity about the tools available and allows the RA to use 
contractually-agreed private law mechanisms to achieve public policy objectives.  However, 
CCPs, members and authorities need to understand the consequences of the different legal 
frameworks. If resolution tools are set out in the CCP rule book, for example, the RA steps 
into the CCP’s shoes on resolution and the boundary between recovery and resolution may be 
blurred, with implications for the timing and status of the ‘resolution trigger’. In any event, 
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statute would still have to provide for the primary rules around resolution, such as when a RA 
would be able to step in.  
We have also seen that the relationship between legislation and rule book may 
influence the amenability of a CCP’s decision-making to judicial review, where public law 
standards are applied. The more prescriptive the governing provisions in legislation, the cases 
suggest, the greater the potential for judicial review of the CCP and the greater the scope for 
affected non-members to bring an action.  Overall, therefore, the neat operational choice 
between framing powers in a CCP’s rule book and legislation is not reflected in an equally 
neat categorisation of potential legal risks.  How rules are framed is unlikely to be wholly 
determinative of the legal challenges which may be brought on either recovery and 
resolution.  In general, given the contextual nature of judicial review, both CCPs and the RA 
should be mindful of their obligations in public law as well as those which arise on more 
familiar legal grounds.  
 
6.2  Tear-up 
It has been seen that in many cases there would be claims on a stressed CCP both at the legal 
entity level (eg, from cash investment) and at the clearing service level.  Full tear-up 
potentially removes all of the latter class of claims while preserving the former.  As such, it 
not only impacts upon the members whose contracts are terminated, but it also dramatically 
changes the size of the claims on the CCP.  Full tear-up could also push losses onto clearing 
members and arguably its use in a systemic clearing service would not meet the objective of 
continuity of critical economic functions.  Therefore, there is a case for requiring permission 
from the CCP’s regulator for its use, and for a cautious approach to setting the price for any 
tear-up. 
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6.3  The resolution trigger 
It is relatively easy to construct scenarios where, in the terminology of table 3, an early, 
middle period or late resolution might be required.  This justification for flexibility and 
subjective decision making, combined with the likelihood of multilateral challenges to any 
resolution which lacks a clear trigger strongly suggests the need for a broadly drafted trigger.  
Such provisions should allow authorities to resolve a CCP on macro-prudential (financial 
stability) grounds as well as for micro-prudential reasons, such as the likely failure of the 
CCP. 
 
6.4  Creditor safeguards in CCP resolution 
There are some areas where the bank resolution regime can be read across to CCPs, but it has 
been seen that the precise formulation of the NCWO safeguard is not one of them.  In the 
CCP context, creditor safeguards are clearly needed, given the wide scope and potential 
impact of the resolution tools.  However, the NCWO safeguard should not be formulated 
using bankruptcy as the counterfactual, not least because this approach may not fix the 
maximum size of the loss the RA can allocate at the point of resolution.  In order to be 
workable and robust, it is important that the safeguard is easily determinable at the point of 
resolution: for instance, one could base a counterfactual on full tear-up at a price that just 
allocates all the available default resources, making full use of any available non-default loss 
allocation, and using any other resources (such as CCP equity) to meet legal entity claims 
according to the creditor hierarchy.
99
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6.5  Equity dilution at the point of CCP resolution 
Overall, the post-crisis reforms are a substantial opportunity for CCP owners because they 
have increased demand for clearing services.  From this perspective, enhanced CCP 
regulation and the new regimes for recovery and resolution can be seen as a quid pro quo.  It 
would clearly be unfair for third parties to contribute resources to resolution, and thereafter 
for the future profits of the stabilised CCP to flow exclusively to the original owners.  
Moreover, CCP owners could always voluntarily contribute more resources to the CCP to 
stave off resolution, for instance using a rights issue, so dilution will only occur if they are 
unwilling or unable to provide extra resources.  Tools which result in equity dilution in a 
CCP resolution are therefore justifiable as long as they are balanced out by the protections 
build into the ECHR right to private property. This approach strikes the right balance 
between the rights of CCP owners, the interests of the RA and the rights of those contributing 
to resolution. 
 
6.6  Barriers to resolution  
The analysis presented in sections 1.5 and 5.4 suggests that the legal entity structure of a 
clearing group can present a barrier to resolution in some cases.  For instance, resolution is 
usually framed as applying to a legal entity, not a clearing service.  This means that legal 
entities which host multiple clearing services may limit the freedom of action of RAs, 
especially if the CCP manages margin at the legal entity rather than clearing service level 
(and thus non-cleared claims include those relating to the investment of net margin at the 
legal entity).  To frame the challenge constructively, it may be possible to conduct a 
resolution using a bridge CCP if: 
 if there is only one systemic clearing service in a CCP;  
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 the assets necessary to clear (eg, intellectual property, systems, staff, etc) are in a 
separately capitalised service company; and  
 posted margin for the service being resolved can be identified and transferred to a new 
legal entity. 
 
However, if any of these conditions are not met, then this route may be difficult, especially if 
the NCWO safeguard is phrased in terms of net claims on the legal entity.  The structure of 
CCP groups can therefore sometimes act as a barrier to the use of some resolution tools, and 
there may be a case for RAs to consider whether this impediment, where present, should be 
addressed.  
 
6.7  Conclusion  
History tells us that CCPs may fail.  Furthermore, post-crisis rules mandating clearing have 
raised the stakes in CCP failure: clearing houses now clear 75% of contracts in certain sectors 
of the derivatives market
100
 and, in the UK alone, CCPs collected in over £160 billion in 
initial margin in 2016.
101
  CCP distress may be unlikely, but it is now vital for financial 
stability that an orderly recovery or resolution can be affected should it occur.  
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 ‘As of end-June 2016, 75% of dealers’ outstanding OTC interest rate derivatives contracts were against 
central counterparties (CCPs), compared with 37% for credit derivatives and less than 2% for foreign exchange 
and equity derivatives.  Overall, 62% of the $544 trillion in notional amounts outstanding reported by dealers 
was centrally cleared.’ BIS, Monetary and Economic Department, Statistical Release: OTC derivatives statistics 
at end-June 2016 (November 2016), 3 available at  http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1611.pdf  
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 The figure is from The Bank of England, The Bank of England’s supervision of financial market 
infrastructures, Annual Report, (February 2017) 8.  
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The starting point for this paper was that recovery and resolution rules are an integral part of 
the post-crisis OTC derivatives regulatory programme.  It follows, therefore, that the same 
over-riding objectives which made the first wave of reforms necessary provide a guide with 
which to balance competing interests when regulators come to finalise and implement the 
recovery and resolution regime.  This approach does not, however, always lead to 
uncontroversial solutions and contented stakeholders. 
The paper has demonstrated how post-crisis derivatives reforms have created a 
public-private hybrid in terms of rules, stakeholders and potential legal challenges.  This 
hybridity means that there are often multiple types of challenge available to the disaffected.  
We have shown how thinking ahead to potential legal challenges can assist in policy-making.  
On the basis of such an analysis, we have put forward suggestions framing the role and 
responsibilities of different stakeholders and we have argued that a future regime for CCP 
recovery and resolution must, above all, strike an informed balance between public policy 
and private rights in order to promote the over-riding objectives of this vast reform project in 
a predictable and certain way. 
